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ABSTRACT. Antonio Gramsci’s point that battles are won and lost on the terrain of
ideology is a much earlier and more complex explanation of the mediations between
objective economic and social conditions and politics. It accounts generally for the fact
that the continuation of contradiction—as must ever be the case under capitalism—and
the worsening conditions for the majority of the world’s population do not mean the
emergence of a political opposition to capitalism. Put simply, the great traditional
workforces cannot strike at capitalism in its new heart. On the other hand, the two
percent might be able to do so if it was not disaggregated because of its dispersal in new
workforces that have no central workplaces or sufficient shared experience to overcome
cultural differences, which divide rather than unite—if it did not live the new space-time
relation. This labour mobility undoes class formation, even among those who do not
share in the benefits of globalisation but dream of doing so. It remains to be seen whether
the new nationalism and its closed borders, which keep such migrants at home with their
contradictions, will foster conditions for the constitution of new collective workingclass consciousness. Global capitalism fixes class relations in an impure state—a pure
duality of capitalists and proletariat never develops anywhere. This means that any
socialist transformation requires the building of a cross-class alliance of majorities on
national-popular bases, rather than class. Therefore, that hegemony, which permits new
ideas to become social forces, has to win out over the old hegemony in an organisational
“war of position.”
KEYWORDS. Antonio Gramsci · hegemony · globalisation

INTRODUCTION
Implicit in the Leninist view from What is to be Done? (1902) to The State
and Revolution (1917) is the realisation that the lived experience of the
contradictions of capitalist society on all levels does not automatically
result in a revolutionary socialist consciousness no matter what the
level of contradiction is. Political action of some sort is required to
develop that consciousness. This implies a struggle between two
ideologies: that of the ruling class and that of the socialist movement
which opposes it. However, as Antonio Gramsci points out, Vladimir
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Lenin never fully developed this implicit recognition of “hegemony,”
(Gramsci 1975, 866) although it was present in the strategy of the
united front. In Lenin, the failure to theorise the notion led to
ambiguities. Though less serious and discarded early, the first was the
notion that all that was needed to break the hold of bourgeois ideas was
a work of propaganda—new enlightenment. The second, which was
always present in Leninism and its heirs, was the development of the
first: that once the proletariat and its allies were enlightened, any
process of breaking the hold of the ideas of the ruling class would give
way to a clear recognition that all social institutions were instruments
of the bourgeoisie (see What is to be Done? and The State and Revolution).
The presumption in both was that there was a true scientific view of
society, which some could see before others, and that the former would
demystify the latter. The theoretical problems are great if, as Karl Marx
claimed, it is only through the changing of circumstances that world
views can be changed.
While similar problems were implicit in the cultural messianism
of Lukács, only Gramsci managed to escape the “hidden God” of an
author of social change; although by now, most theorists were intent
on escaping them. Starting from the Leninist view that the state is
coercion plus consensus (Gramsci 1975, 763-4), Gramsci moved away
from the common ground. To do so, he had to proceed through three
stages of understanding, which can be schematically separated as
recognition of: the state as an organiser and not a coercer; its
organizational agents (intellectuals) as unconscious creators of the very
formal order of this world (e.g., the way the factory or any other social
practices is ordered); and the location in time and space of the citizen
so that he or she can only see matters from his or her point of view, as
a citizen individual. It followed that any socialist revolution would be
the product of the creation of a new order—a reorganisation (Gramsci
1975, 801-2 and 1518-19).
Gramsci’s historical progression was in reverse order from this
analysis that was to be found only in his mature work, The Prison
Notebooks. It is the combination that is important. It is informed
precisely by the overall problematique he described in a letter to his
sister as “the popular creative mind” (Gramsci 1965, 59); that is, how
far the “people” could escape this “hegemony.” What then is hegemony?

HEGEMONY
Hegemony is the distinctive mode of rule in the modern state, which
Gramsci describes as emerging in the second half of the nineteenth
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century. He indicates that sometimes it is a state form which antedates
France and England by as much as two centuries. He writes, “In the
period after 1870, with the colonial expansion of Europe…the internal
and international organizational relations of the State become more
complex and intricate and the fortieightist formula of the ‘permanent
revolution’ is elaborated and superseded in political science by the
formula of ‘civil hegemony’.” For the first time, the state can be
regarded as “integral” as “political society plus civil society, that is
hegemony armoured with coercion” (Gramsci 1975, 1566-7). A
period then begins when the state needs the consensus of the citizen
and must create that consensus for it to function. For Gramsci,
coercion is not the essence of state power. Hegemony is power. It may
be protected by coercion.
Like many other Marxists, Gramsci began from the presupposition
that a materialist starting point was always that of an already given
complex structure. Except in thought, this structure could not be
reduced into the categories of base and superstructure or state and civil
society. For technical, rational, or irrational reasons, the structured
capitalist mode of production was always in a specific order or form.
It is from the economic structure that the theory of hegemony starts.
Every social group born on the original terrain of an essential function
in the world of economic production, creates with itself, organically, one
or more classes of intellectuals who give it homogeneity and awareness of
its own function not only in the economic field, but also in the social and
political: The capitalist entrepreneur creates with himself the technician
of industry, the scientist of political economy, the organizer of a new
culture, of a new law, etc., etc. We should note that an (capitalist)
entrepreneur represents a higher social development, which is already
characterised by a certain educative (dirigente) and technical (that is,
intellectual) capacity: He must have a certain technical capacity, beyond
that in the area which is circumscribed by his activity and initiative, in other
areas, at least in those closest to economic production (he must be an
organizer of masses of men, he must be an organizer of “trust” of those
who save money in his enterprise, or the purchasers of his goods etc. If not
all entrepreneurs, at least an elite among them must have a capacity to
organize society in general, in all its complex organism of services, up to
the State organism, because of the need to create the most favourable
conditions for the expansion of his own class; or he must have at least the
ability to select “agents” (commessi) {specialized employees} to whom he can
entrust the organizational activity of general relations between his enterprise
and the outside. (Gramsci 1975, 474-5 and 432-4)
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Gramsci emphasised not only the organisational nature of these
tasks. Because they are specialists, these intellectuals-organisers tend to
know only partial and primitive aspects of the new type of society that
the new class has put in place. They do not have knowledge of its
outcomes as a combination of relations in the whole of society.
He further clarified that since all humans combine cerebral and
muscular activity, all humans—even the factory worker turned into the
“domesticated gorilla” by Taylorised factory production could be
regarded as intellectuals. However, he is interested only in those who
have the function of organisers (“at some time everyone fries an
egg…..but we do not say that everyone is a cook”). They are the
“functionaries”of the “superstructures.”
For the moment we can fix two great superstructural “levels” what we can
call “civil society,” that is the ensemble of organisms vulgarly called
“private” and that of “political society” or “the State” to which correspond
the function of “hegemony” that the dominant groups exercises throughout
society and to that of “direct domination” or command which is
expressed through the State and in the State as a rule of law (Stato
“giuridico”). These functions are organizational and connective in the
precise sense. The intellectuals are the “agents” of the dominant groups
in the exercise of the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political
government, that is: 1) the “spontaneous consensus” accorded by the
great mass of the population to the direction of society impressed on social
life by the fundamental dominant group, a consensus which is born
“historically” from the prestige (and thus the trust) which the dominant
group derives from its position and function in the world of production;
2) of the apparatus of State coercion which ensures “legally” the discipline
over those groups who do not “consent” either actively or passively, but
which is constituted for all of society in anticipation of moments of crisis
in command and leadership in which spontaneous consent is lacking.
(Gramsci 1975, 476 and 1513)

Gramsci admitted that this greatly extends the definition of
“intellectual.” Indeed, the replacement of the word “intellectual” by
“organizer” would be better to avoid confusion with notions of a
dispassionate or a didactic function “from above.” It should be noted
that they are primarily organisers who organise both the structures of
civil society and the state. Later he clarifies that the State and civil
society overlap. They are not, strictly speaking, separate under capitalism.
A state that relies only on coercion when consent is collapsing—as
Gramsci thought it was after 1917—is primarily an administrative state
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with great intellectuals who provide it with an overview of what human
beings should and aspire to be. Yet, he never denies that administration
and law are coercive. All rules are, and life without rules is savagery or
Rousseauian utopianism. He deliberately uses the Machiavellian image
of the state as a centaur—half-beast, half-human.
The intellectuals’ role is one of coercive discipline—in the sense of
training people to fulfill their assigned role. Socialisation means
discipline and the move from savage beast to civilised being comes
through education, which involves “effort, boredom and suffering”
(Gramsci 1975, 1549). The most mechanical of workers is a
“domesticated gorilla;” that is, trained to his or her role. Thus, even as
administration and rule of law, the state is coercive. Thus, unlike
Lenin, Gramsci is concerned with uniting, theoretically, the notion of
the state as coercion and what he calls “consensus,” and not merely
noting the obvious —the instruments of state power from time to time
and place to place—and using the carrot and the stick in different
proportions (Pizzorno 1969). It is this theoretical unification of both
notions which constitutes hegemony in its developed sense. In this,
Gramsci stressed the opposite of Lenin’s view by making crucial the
quality of any state—not only in terms of the fact that it was an
instrument of oppression and could be revealed as such, but also that
it was the expression of popular consensus and exercised its coercive
power in favour of the existing system of production with that consent,
which it had inculcated in an “education.”
Gramsci understood education as organisation. Within it, the
conscious ideas then proffered as either enlightenment or mystification
are entrusted to those with the function of education, in its narrow
sense of schooling. In a passage dealing with the coercive nature of all
states, he insists that the educative function of state creates a new
“civility,” but adds “…from the fact that it operates essentially on
economic forces, that it reorganises and develops the apparatus of
economic production, that it makes structural innovations, should
not be drawn the consequential view that superstructural matters are
left to themselves, to their spontaneous development, to a chance and
sporadic germination.” He insists that the state rationalises even
through the criminal law, which has a civilising function. Indeed, such
law has been promoted by incentives as well as repression (Gramsci
1975, 978-9).
By organising society’s multiple productive and reproductive
practices into a specific combination, depending on time and place,
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the hosts of different organisers—from foremen to the greatest
philosophers in any society—materially place each person in a specific
place which he lives as an “atom” (Marx) or as a “citizen-individual”
(Gramsci). The practical effect of the specific combination of social
relations of production is to separate those who “feel” from those who
“know.” While a person may continually feel that matters are wrong
because of the contradictions engendered by the capitalist mode of
production, he or she is unable as an individual to translate these
feelings into political action of a coherent sort, although they may
revolt.
The relationship between “feeling” and “knowing” is relative. For
Gramsci, all people are philosophers in that they have a world view and
no “muscular-nervous” activity is mindless. “Every man outside his
profession is engaged in some intellectual activity, that is, a ‘philosopher’,
an artist, a man of taste: participates in a view of the world, has a
conscious line of moral conduct, and thus contributes to maintain or
to change a view of the world, and thus to raise new ways of thinking”
(Gramsci 1975, 1550-1). However, where the problem is to replace an
existing hegemony with a new socialist hegemony, a new intellectual
had to be elaborated, who was involved in practical life “as a constructor,
an organizer, ‘a permanent persuader’ because he is not purely an
orator…from work technique he reaches science technique and a
historic-humanistic conception, without which he remains a ‘specialist’
and does not become a ‘leader’ (specialist-politician)” (Gramsci 1975,
1551). Again, there is the striking insistence on education as permanent
organisation and not merely an oratorical or didactic function in the
“vulgar” sense of intellectual activity.
The importance of the organised separation between “feeling” and
“thinking” practices under capitalism lies in the ideological effect.
Since the organiser by profession does not live the experience of the
working class, the former becomes really committed to the idea of
scientific knowledge, which is abstracted from “passion.” This makes
his relationship with the mass merely formal and bureaucratic. Thus,
the attributes of “priesthood” are attached to the function of the
intellectual. Neither the organisers nor the organised learn from the
lives of the other. Valid social knowledge does not appear to come in
a process where practice is theorised and theory is subjected to
rectification in practice. It seems to come from above (Gramsci 1975,
452). This detachment is most likely to exist when there is an
insufficient number of organisers or intellectuals.
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This detachment would last even in developed capitalism since
Gramsci likened a social transformation at that stage to a long period
of trench warfare, wherein huge masses of people would be involved in
a struggle of hegemonies that would occupy the entire social terrain
even as bourgeois hegemony broke down (Gramsci 1975, 865-6).
Indeed, Gramsci dated the height of a successful bourgeois hegemony
in Europe from about 1870, although he was careful to distinguish
between its efficacy in different countries. Clearly, he believed it was
weaker in Italy than in France or Britain. Thus, was long-standing—the
product of a long history of organising social life in a particular way.
This absence of counter-hegemonic orders explains why the average
member of the populace was deprived of the tools necessary to oppose
bourgeois hegemony: in his or her schooling by the created order of
social life, he or she could only attain access to knowledge of society and
its historical development by and through learning the appropriate
language; that is by leaving behind the “comprehension” which life
brought (Gramsci 1975, 452). Until such people express their own
intellectuals, who organise them and restructure society in that very
reorganisation, they remain caught in the bind that the only way they
can make sense of their own experience is with the tools with which the
existing schooling in all senses supplies them. Since all learned
languages are removed from the lived experience of the people which
“feels,” the popular language—the lived experience—cannot be translated
into a coherent ideology. When it does, it becomes functional to the
existing system through its form. Gramsci thought that this process of
developing two languages for those who knew and those who feel had
been going on for centuries and had existed everywhere, even in China.
In Europe, it started with the separation of Latin from the vulgar, and
only the closed caste of rulers (usually Churchmen) knew the first
(Gramsci 1975, 353-7 and 557-564): “…the populace sees the rites and
feels the exhortatory prayers, but cannot follow the discussions and the
ideological developments which are the monopolies of a caste”
(Gramsci 1975, 354).
Such practice of the traditional intellectuals had continued in
modern conditions of capitalist hegemony. For Gramsci, it was the
most interesting aspect of such hegemony. It certainly created a tension
between the rationality of modernity and its rationalisations of that
system. He had long identified such legacies of an inescapable past class
structure as typical of the backward semifeudal Italian South. When he
had first become aware that the Turinese proletariat—the height of
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modern production—could not make a socialist revolution without an
alliance with the peasantry (and later he included other classes), he
focused on how to overcome the hostility and diffidence of peasants
towards the Northern proletariat. It was already by 1926 that he had
examined the structural and didactic relations between local petit
bourgeois organisers and what they taught or did not teach the
peasantry, who lived the felt contradictions of agrarian exploitation
but never succeeded in uniting into a mass opposition. Gramsci
pointed out that the peasants were linked by the middle bourgeoisie
of their towns to the “great intellectuals” of Italy. Disaggregated
peasants turned to this network of organisers for leadership, which
included local notables and clergy. It was democratic when facing the
peasant but also reactionary when serving the great landowners. The
village organisers turned all peasant politics into the petty administrative
and political clique-warfare of the existing organs of local government
and the state, which they monopolised and dominated throughout the
Italian peninsula. If this was their organisational face, what they
absorbed and purveyed as a rationalisation for such politics was
influenced by the wisdom of great intellectuals, in particular Benedetto
Croce and Giustino Fortunato. The latter preached a religion of
national and European liberalism that was both antidemocratic and
quietistic. Even the most progressive southern intellectuals could not
be expected to entirely break away from such a starting point and had
to be wooed over to support the Communist solution (Gramsci
1966).
The result was a conformity to a particular type of mass—man—who
could not be autonomous. As Gramsci pointed out in a telling
example, when a person only spoke a dialect and not the national
language—let alone foreign languages—that person was condemned to
a myopia of local communalism (Gramsci 1975, 1377). This is what
happened to the average man. To break out of such limits required a
hard training in grammar, clear thinking, and refusal of the facility of
spoken words. Yet, to have such an education, which was what
southern notables gave their sons and was required by a peasant to shift
up the social scale, was to be caught in the limits of that discourse,
organised ultimately by great intellectuals. Such schooling—again to be
thought of first as organisation and discipline and only then as
proffered ideas—was designed to be functional to the system by closing
down critical thought and speculation about new values dangerous to
capitalism.
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The point, therefore, is capital as it illuminates that no simple
attainment of enlightenment can lead to counter-hegemony. Nor
indeed can an a priori notion of the future or a teleological understanding
of action be developed except in that reorganisation, since reorganisation
is essential for the world to be seen in a new way. Furthermore, as the
constant criticism of the Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and
Enlightenment embodied in Croce makes clear, revolutionary
knowledge cannot have the qualities sought by the Enlightenment or
traditional rationalism.
Only in the most banal of senses is their hegemony a plot of the
ruling classes. The closed nature of their discourse in any realm is
essential to the functional comprehension of the different orders in
society. However, there is certainly a vicious cycle in the authorised
system of reasoning that exists in capitalist society and this is expressed
in its greatest thinkers. From the highest level of abstraction, it runs as
follows, according to Gramsci:
1. An explanation for the way the world works is proposed,
and consequent solutions to existing problems are
found;
2. These propositions are refined in a series of mediations
until they are far from the reality, which they describe
and exist only as “philosophy;” and finally,
3. They are then verified by the “elect minds” which are
already defined by their sites in this process (experts
with certain training).
Taking French hegemony as exemplary, Gramsci points out that
senso comune (popular wisdom) is treated in two ways: “it is made the
basis for philosophy; and, it is criticized from the standpoint of
another philosophy; but in both cases, the result is to overcome a
particular ‘popular wisdom’ to create another, which is closer to the
concept of the world of the leading group” (Gramsci 1975, 1045).
Systematic thought, through placing limits on intellectuals politically,
denies the incoherent views taught by practice to the average man
(Gramsci 1975, 1383ff).
Yet it also remains in contact and brings up to date in a gradual way
the good sense of the masses to agree with the ruling world view
(Gramsci 1975, 1375ff). It is able to do so through high philosophy’s
authority in systematic knowledge. The population esteems
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philosophical analysis even if it prefers and believes “facts” rather than
opinions. But what Gramsci calls the contradiction between what it
learns from life and what it is schooled to make sense of life is only
overcome when the mass is involved in a political struggle to free
themselves from the limits of the hegemonic philosophy of capitalism.
Gramsci went on to say that the “man of the people” believes in
what people like him believe, and seeks security in numbers. He
believes that someone could argue for those beliefs rationally, even if
he cannot do so himself. He remains convinced once and for all. As
Gramsci asserted, this means that creating new convictions in the
masses is extremely difficult if they contrast with the orthodox beliefs
of those who conform with the ruling class hegemony.
However, the process by which hegemonic authority and education
are usually (not always since there is a healthy skepticism as well)
deemed to be the best guarantees of good judgment by the average man
are proven by the impossibility of referring complicated propositions
back to the average man, whose popular wisdom is so contradictory
that any reference to common sense as a proof of truth is nonsense. This
is a closed circle since the appeal to practice (to the “felt”), made by the
philosophers whom Gramsci opposed, proves impossible because this
appeal shows to popular wisdom its own impossibility as a mode of
verification (Gramsci 1975, 1399-1400). Gramsci’s detestation of
artificial languages, idiolalia, and “elect minds” rests on this awareness
that the system precludes the development of a political alternative.
Capitalist hegemony is always contested and never 100 percent
(Gramsci 1975, 958) or ideal, and the degree of its success depends on
the time and place of society in a differentiated imperialist world
(Gramsci 1975, 1566-7). It only tends towards the formation of what
one might regard today as uni-dimensionality because it is nearly always
inserted into an already preceding or existing society (e.g., feudalism).
However, some societies (the new world) were established in the
relative absence of such antecedent history. There, hegemony would
presumably be more complete. In most societies, the capitalist system—
with its bureaucratic state resting on the rule of law, which citizens
support as necessary in the world “that is”—must establish itself against
an earlier equivalent social formation and struggle against it or
compromise with its organisers. Such “traditional intellectuals,” as
opposed to the “organic intellectuals” of capitalism, necessarily import
into the new society a whole host of ideas which are not functional to
the new mode of production (Gramsci 1975, 474ff). While international
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forces of imperialism guarantee the continuance of the classes, which
such traditional intellectuals organise as the case in Europe when
Gramsci wrote, the ideas of these intellectuals will exist as real social
forces and not merely as insubstantial notions doomed to be swept
away in the inevitable development of capitalism and the polarisation
of society into the two classes of proletariat and capitalists.
The “bizarre combination” of conditions that results in popular
wisdom is present above all in folklore, which contains both good and
bad sense (Gramsci 1975, 89). It is thus the starting point for any
counter-hegemony.
The point of departure must always be “popular wisdom” (senso comune),
which is spontaneously the philosophy of the multitude which it is a
matter of making ideologically homogeneous;…it is necessary to move
from what the pupil already knows, from his philosophical experience
(after having shown that he has such an experience, that he is a ‘philosopher”
without knowing it) .And since this presupposes a certain intellectual and
cultural average among the pupils, who assumedly have had only
fragmentary and occasional information, and lack any methodological
and practical preparation ,you cannot but start from popular wisdom
in the first place, religion in the second…and only in the third place from
the systems elaborated by the traditional intellectual groups. (Gramsci
1975, 1397 and 1401)

Both science and the state attempt to eliminate it through all the
instruments of socialisation—from the family to the workplace. Yet, it
is not static and it develops at all times in relation to the lived
experience of members of society. It is not the content of popular
beliefs which are of primary significance—though they may sometimes
contradict authority in the service of ignorance—but their imperative
nature when they function as norms of conduct (Gramsci 1965, 348).
Gramsci noted that Marx approved of popular wisdom in such terms
when he was also calling for a “…new popular wisdom and thus a new
culture and philosophy which is rooted in popular consciousness in
the same solid way and with the same imperative force as traditional
beliefs” (Gramsci 1975, 1400). He insisted that success was met when
ideas proposed by the organisers were tested, modified, and refined in
a constant exchange—a work of “permanent persuasion” on both
sides—with the masses who made clear what would galvanise or have an
imperative force on them in a particular situation. He thus proposed
a new practice of philosophy, not merely—as many others have done—
a new philosophy of practice. This meant a change in the way he
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associated all the traditional categories used in Marxism. No longer was
there the reduction of difference to an essential progressive force in
society—the world historical proletariat—against whose progressive and
soon-to-be-official worldview could be read off as matters of folklore,
popular culture, and common sense—all of which were viewed negatively.
Here, we see a clear divergence from the Enlightenment position of
Lenin in What is to be Done?, where “ten wise men are worth a hundred
fools.” One might say that for Gramsci, all men are potentially wise. As
an early theoretician of social movements, his fundamental problem
had become how to articulate different movements that started from
a differentiated society—which in conditions of worldwide uneven
development could never be expected to tend toward the two-class
model essential to theories that made the proletarian science official
and progressive—in a national popular alliance (see Lukács). Thus,
Gramsci was at the start of rethinking the status of the Enlightenment
that was characteristic of postmodern thought.
What then is it to make such popular wisdom ideologically
homogeneous when the process is not that of Enlightenment? Certainly,
bad sense is left behind in popular wisdom, where past prejudices
become imbricated with popularised science and new experience.
There is also a departure from whatever makes human beings passive,
in the sense that they do not choose to which norms or political
movements they will adhere. But there is no rejection of the form or
way in which they think or an obliteration of what makes human beings
human by rationalisation or tailoring to the functional needs of
society. Gramsci wrote that a distinction must be made between “…the
fossilized reflections of the conditions of days gone by, and therefore
conservative and reactionary, others consisting of a range of often
creative and progressive innovations, spontaneously determined by the
forms and conditions of life as it is developing, which go against, or
merely differ from, the morality of the ruling strata” (Gramsci 1975,
2313). The distinction is between items of knowledge and a positive
moral weltanschauung (world and life view). He encapsulated this as not
being able to make history without “passion.” What is known and
what is felt must be united—the object is not simply to have the first
exclude the second (Gramsci 1975, 451-2).
Gramsci made this very clear in his discussion of the “domesticated
gorilla,” into which Taylorised capitalism seeks to turn the modern
factory worker. His comments must be seen in the context of his
further observation of capitalist hegemony as normally complete that
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any sign of autonomy is to be grasped, analysed, and built upon. He
wrote,
American industrialists have understood very well that the “domesticated
gorilla” is a phrase, that the worker remains “nevertheless” a man and that
even he, while he works, thinks as well or at least has much greater
opportunity to think, at least when he has got over the crisis of adaptation
and has not been eliminated; and not only does he think, but the fact that
he does not get immediate satisfaction from his work, and understands
that they want to turn him into a “domesticated gorilla,” can lead him to
a train of thought which is far from conformist. (Gramsci 1975, 2171)

He typified the attempt to create such a being as “rationalization,”
which is something to be avoided or opposed (Gramsci 1975, 2146)
as an unnatural discipline that seeks to regulate human beings in their
personal and sexual worlds through their minds. Not only is this
attained by “unheard-of brutality” (Gramsci 1975, 2161), but it also
denies work as something that involves the workers’ “intelligence,
fantasy and initiative,” in support of turning them into machines
functional to a system. Not only was this totalitarian (Gramsci 1975,
2165), it was also a result of Enlightenment views, as Gramsci stated
explicitly, which privileged mind over matter: “We must insist on the
fact that in the sexual field the most depraving and ‘regressive’
ideological factor is the enlightenment and libertarian concept of the
class not directly involved in production” (Gramsci 1975, 2163).
Clearly a human being is creative; as such, he or she is able to dream
even within the constraints of the conditions to which he or she must
adapt through rules. To free that creativity implies a real choice of
which world—and the group or class within it—an individual chooses
to belong to. That requires autonomy of thought. When Gramsci
criticised the provincial attitudes developed in a bourgeois hegemony,
it was because such values were undergone and unconscious rather than
deliberately chosen.
…is it preferable to “think” without being critically aware of it, in a
fragmentary and haphazard manner, that is to “participate” in a world
view “imposed” mechanically by the external environment, that is, by one
of the many social groups in which everyone is automatically involved
from the moment they enter into the world of consciousness (which can
be your own village or province, can have its origins in the parish and the
“intellectual activity” of the local priest or the aging patriarch whose
“wisdom” is law ,in the little old woman who has inherited the wisdom of
witches or in the petty intellectual soured by his own stupidity and inability
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to act, or is it preferable to elaborate your own world view with awareness
and critically and thus, in connection with such labour by your own brain,
to choose your own sphere of activity, to participate actively in the
production of the history of the world, to be your own guide and not
accept passively and supinely from outside the imprinting of your own
personality? (Gramsci 1975, 1375-6)

Again, we see the insistence on the way a person thinks, not the
contents of his or her beliefs—typical of Enlightenment thought
(compare Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School generally). Scientific
thought, then, could not be opposed positively to “vulgar” popular
philosophy or even to ever-changing folklore which was the expression
or vehicle of the latter.
To liberate humanity was more than to free a thinking head, as
Immanuel Kant believed. It was to construct a social wisdom, which
humans struggled to make coherent from its diverse parts and constantly
rectified in their overall views. It did not preclude religious or magical
thought or dreams, nor did it reduce love to sex and biology. It was
against the resuscitation of any “hidden God,” which explained or
drove all other aspects of society and whose imposition spelt tyranny,
even when, as in Croce, it was “freedom.” A counter-hegemony built
from below—from the multiple, diverse, and disaggregated views of the
people that challenge the totalising visions of the ruling hegemony—
certainly required a complete reorganisation of society. But it could
only refuse essentialism and its totalitarian outcomes.

GLOBALISATION AND RETHINKING HEGEMONY
As the author of the Varying Seasons of Gramscian Studies (Davidson
1972), I am the first to recognise that our interpretations of categories
in Gramsci’s thought have and will change (compare Liguori 1996).
This is as true of his core notion, hegemony, as of the peripheral or
subordinate dimensions in his thought.
What is involved in such a rethinking? Some preliminary remarks
are in order. It is clear that any first reading must be presentist if his
work is to be read in light of contemporary problems. Such unavoidable
historicism alters the status—not the nature—that we accord to any
scientific or universal knowledge we might subsequently derive from
our interrogation of Gramsci’s thought. This scientific knowledge is
certainly the goal that is required if Gramsci is to be used to understand
how hegemony works even if the status of scientific knowledge is
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subject to revision as time elapses and further problems arise. Moreover,
the scientific knowledge is limited by the rules of its discourse. It is not
an affectively-lived concern capable of galvanising political forces. The
historicist reading is capable of doing so in accordance with the Marxist
canon that politics takes place on the terrain of such ideology.
The present problem is that of globalisation. The presentist
rereading of Gramsci will seek to discover in his work implicit and
explicit ways in which he foresaw that problem and how he linked his
notion of hegemony to that reality. This is to see how far he was “a
thinker before his time,” who intimated the epochal change known as
globalisation in its early structured manifestations. Such a subjectivist
historicist reading may well lead to the discovery that there are hitherto
missed theoretical connections in his work precisely because the
question of whether they were there or not was not posed earlier. It may
also lead to the realisation that there is nothing in his work that is of
relevance to the problem of globalisation, at the same time as there is
nothing in the subjective views of Aristotle. Globalisation, as we will
describe it, was clearly unimaginable to the latter. We might well
discover the same in Gramsci’s work.
Even if we were able to find in the Gramscian canon an awareness
ante litteram of globalisation, to avoid the unacceptable utilitarian
“what is alive and what is dead in Gramsci,” we must engage in the
further exercise of how far that subjective view is coherent or valid by
reference to the entirety of his thought and in its presuppositions
adequate to our problem. This second interrogation requires—within
the limits already indicated—a production of a scientific theory which
is self-grounding, new, and different when compared to other thinkers
(usually earlier in time) on whom he built. If we are interested in finding
out whether the notion of hegemony is incorporated sufficiently into
a theory of what we now call “globalisation,” it is necessary also to
consider whether and how far the implicit basic philosophical notions
within which all the categories were thought in Gramsci’s work can still
be relevant today.
In our case, it is clear that Gramsci explicitly found the notion of
hegemony already present in Lenin’s work. However, it also states that
Lenin did not elaborate it scientifically as Gramsci intended to do. As
such, he makes the double reading which we have described.
These rather lengthy preliminary remarks are necessary to explain
why the extensive literature on the similarities between Gramsci’s
hegemony and that of the ancients—Niccolo Machiavelli, Lenin, or
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Gaetano Mosca—will not be considered here despite their merits (see
Fontana 1993, 2000; Finocchiaro 1999, Gruppi 1976; compare the
French version in Dialectiques [Perelman 1975, 5-54]).
On the other hand, the voluminous literature on hegemony,
which updates Gramsci in terms of new problems posed by globalisation
and its effect on all categories that depend on the nation-state (e.g.,
democracy and citizenship), is relevant even if its theses are not always
acceptable (Vacca 1991, Montanari 1991, Losurdo 1997; for an
overview of the debate about Gramsci’s thought see Liguori 1996).

GRAMSCI AND HEGEMONY
In the extensive literature on this subject (see Cammett 1991, updated
2005), I share the views of Giuseppe Vacca and Marcello Montanari
almost completely (Vacca 1991, Montanari 1991). Their theses
correspond with my views on hegemony in almost every detail,
although I elaborated independently (compare also Davidson 1982,
introduction). It is therefore useful to recapitulate Vacca’s statement
on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony.
Vacca asserts that hegemony—the core concept in Gramsci’s work—
is to be found in Lenin’s work in insufficiently elaborated form, as
Gramsci always stated. “The theory of hegemony is…. elaborated for
the political constitution of ‘new progressive groupings’…the whole
programme of the Quaderni must be investigated in terms of those
connections” (Vacca 1991, 19). It does not exist in Marx himself. Yet,
Gramsci wished to elaborate a completely new notion of politics from
that of Lenin. Hence, hegemony marks a rupture with all earlier Marxist
political thought about power. It is not a Western tactic, but a new way
of understanding the worldwide system of rule that emerged after
1917. Vacca writes:
We can never emphasise enough the fact that in the crucial paragraph 24
of Quaderno 13 dedicated to the connection between hegemony and the
‘war of position’ Gramsci considers the October revolution the last
episode of ‘the war of manoeuvre’ after which the problem of revolution
is everywhere posed in terms of a ‘war of position’ ‘The last example of
this (that is, the last case of a ‘frontal assault’)—he affirms—political history
were the events of 1917. They marked a decisive turn in the history of the
science and art of politics.’ Thus he ends up enunciating a doctrine of
hegemony as a complement to the coercive State and the present form of
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the 48ist doctrine of ‘permanent revolution’. In the elaboration of these
two concepts are found the innovations contained in the Gramscian
concept of politics. (1991, 11-12)

Moreover, the notion of hegemony arises from the crisis of the
nation-state and its replacement as the subject of politics by an
international or world subject—the world capitalist economy. It is very
important to note that Gramsci’s theory is posited on a belief that an
epochal change is taking place globally: “..the subordination of the
coercive State to hegemonic politics is realised in the process of the
formation and the advance of ‘an economy on a world scale’: a process
which gives rise to an overcoming {of existing social relations}” (Vacca
1991, 22). When Gramsci wrote the famous words that Marxism and
Leninism stated (the international situation “must be considered in its
national aspects”), this is because the “‘national’ relation is the result
of an original ‘combination’ which is unique (in a certain sense), that
this originality and uniqueness must be understood and conceptualised
if we wish to dominate and direct it. Certainly the development is
towards internationalism, but the starting point is ‘national’ and it is
from that starting point that we must make our moves. But the
perspective is international and cannot but be that.” The combination
of national forces, which the international class brings together in a
national hegemony, requires correct interpretation if those forces are
to be led through various stages into an overall effective world
economy. In turn, Vacca (1991, 46-48) tells us that this new subjectivity
must be relational (not individualistic). Thus, it poses philosophical
questions to the famous 1859 preface of Marx. The contents should
be read not as a statement of fact but that of tendency. As such, they
raise the issue of a passive revolution being a prerequisite for the
transition or overcoming of existing capitalist contradictions. This is
one reason why the “war of position” must be seen as morphological,
not geographical, in status.
Hence, the categories in Gramsci are not absolute, but relational.
Even seemingly absolute statements about a transition like “the
starting point is national,” which have led commentators to mistake
Gramsci for a western Marxist, have to be read in relation to others.
Vacca points out that the insistence on maintaining an international
perspective follows this celebrated formulation. Where the categories
are relational, only the global can have preeminence.
In an early work (Davidson 1982), I suggested that Gramsci
regarded international (then we called it “imperialist”) class relations in
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interpreting each nation-state at a particular stage of development and
thus combining many different modes of production and corresponding
social relations in one space. For example, in Italy there was a large
vestigial peasantry that was not going to disappear in some linear
process towards two classes (according to the great mantra of The
Communist Manifesto). As the peasants continued to live those relations,
which was always in a particular organised form (hence the importance
of the people who organised it [the intellectuals]), it kept bizarre
combination of its old worldviews with more modern ones. Those
views could not be demystified in some process of enlightenment
against what was taught everyday. Consequently, a proletariat—informed
by the most advanced understanding—had to make compromises with
the worldviews of other classes if it wishes to build a strong enough bloc
of classes to displace the existing bourgeois hegemony.
This overcoming would require a democratic compromise that
would allow the building of a bloc of classes in a particular situation.
Bearing in mind that the State is no more than the complex of political
practices through which the classe dirigente (leading class) obtains the
active consensus of the governed, Gramsci insisted that it was in
permanent crisis by the 1920s in many states much earlier. Parliamentary
liberalism could no longer secure the necessary consensus. The existing
representative bodies were insufficient when hegemony had shifted to
a global arena. This shift had ended the preeminence of the liberal state
and its presuppositions in contractualism and proceduralism. These
had to be complemented by practices directed to attaining a universal
human solidarity. Montanari (1991, 86-90) puts it as the need to attain
an ethical being who is more than work or social-political reproduction
itself. Going beyond existing parliamentarism requires the expansion
of existing democratic practices to make them ever more inclusive.
When Gramsci considered what that global capitalism might be,
he focused on Americanism and Fordism as universalising spaces
within which a new anticapitalist must be forged. Counter-hegemony
is to be found in this. Global capitalist hegemony takes the form of the
reproduction of humanity as the “domesticated or tamed gorilla.”
Such a being is not changed into another, who tends towards global
human solidarity through the action of a party alone; although the
latter is one starting point for the construction of a new collective will.
Rather, the human being is formed on an industrial terrain (Gramsci
1975, 862), which is its site, in a manner of speaking. For reasons that
will become clear later, we wish to emphasise this point. It certainly
allows Gramsci to avoid the error of class expressivism and totalitarian
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notions of the party, which is wrongly held by many theorists of
hegemony as implied by a supposed commitment to the class struggle
for which democracy and compromise with others are a sham. “In
hegemony politics, which is inconceivable without asserting the
relationality and reciprocity of subjects, no part can be conceived of as
pars totalis” (Vacca 1991, 83).
Thus, while any political action had to start on a national terrain,
this was because of the site accorded to that terrain in a global
economy. In fact, the drive was towards a modern form of
cosmopolitanism (Vacca 1991, 84-5; Gramsci 1975, 1988). Hegemony,
as interdependence, meant that national-state politics could never be
absolute, as well as any unity referred to the world system. As hegemony
was concerned with relational interdependence in a global space, the
hegemonic function of intellectuals was divorced from intentional
party or political relations. They were ideologically unconscious
organisers.
Vacca argues that Gramsci’s starting point in the model of the
factory councils should therefore be understood not as a commitment
to a workerist factory or economic model of production democracy,
but as his national solution to the bourgeois failure to reconstitute the
world market. The American model was not regarded by Gramsci as
universal in its validity as the United States was the child of Europe,
whose culture remained “the only historical and civilisational universal.”
While the counter-hegemony might remain tendential at the greatest
level of generality, it must, we infer, start from that universal (Vacca
1991, 106).
This revolution is inclusionary, not exclusionary. Politically, what
remains all-important is how the dominant global hegemony is
replaced by a counter-hegemony. It is notable that Vacca is weakest or
most general on that point and he concludes on a fairly Eurocentric
note, as he himself is aware. His thesis, in this regard, could almost be
caricatured in contemporary jargon as Europe versus America, with the
former as the highest attainment of theory (Marxism) and the latter as
exemplar of the global trap.

GLOBALISATION
The morphological quality of hegemony, which Vacca so genially
emphasises, rests on the recognition of the overriding importance of
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the world economy and the way it determines national politics. The
world economy or market sets rules that seek to turn human beings
into tamed gorillas and consumers. It is important to note that
Gramsci saw perspicaciously that the old world of nation-state capitalist
politics was in crisis, because it could no longer manage the economy
or market within its terms. As Vacca emphasises, even more important
is the explicit recognition that class war has ended and a new epochal
anticapitalist politics must be tried everywhere. It is equally notable
that Gramsci wanted a national-popular revolution to replace class
politics and argued that such required more than a Fascist corporatism
with its national autarky and nascent stakeholderism. It required a new
form of democratic politics. However, Vacca does not go sufficiently
far to allow us to affirm that Gramsci addressed what is essential to
globalisation.
It is true that globalisation marks a new supranational form of
capitalism. On the other hand, the new global epoch is supposedly
ruptural in a way historically never seen before. It is not simply the
latest qualitatively unchanged form of capitalism. The best
commentators are overwhelmingly of the opinion that its main novelty
is how its novel production and reproduction technologies change
earlier space-time relation. It calls into question all notions of space
and time one-with-themselves that have hitherto dominated social
thought. Usually, this is explained by the advent of the Internet in the
last fifteen years. This does not simply allow capital, goods, and labour
to be in many places at the same time. But it ensures that the affective
experience of space and time is altered radically for human beings. The
very nature of human beings is changed with the speed of communication
and dwindling of space and, therefore, time scales. The sense of self and
identity of individuals are fragmented in unheard-of ways for huge
migrating workforces.
Let me unpack some of these assertions where they are relevant to
how far Gramsci’s theory of hegemony can account for them. Important
for our purposes is the widely-acknowledged fact that instantaneous
transfer of information and capital allows goods to be produced in a
highly-decentralised fashion. No product needs be transformed from
raw material to final polished item in one place anymore. Thus all
significant production is decentralised. The most significant product
is, of course, information itself. Winning the edge in that information
is what permits comparative advantage and better capital accumulation.
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More important for our purposes is what is claimed about labour
and labour power under globalisation. Sami Nair (1997, 2) puts it this
way:
We have entered a period of huge displacement of population. I use the
word displacement deliberately, for when the populations of entire
regions leave, this is not because they want to leave but because they are
obliged to by the situation. In fact, what is called globalisation, the
extending of the economy to the globe, goes together with the uprooting
of entire peoples, abandoned by the flight of productive structures, left
to the blind forces of the world market. Even the rich countries undergo
these changes fully…

These huge migrating workforces follow the ever-changing
information-driven markets for labour, going from country to country,
site to site, and job to job; never before in history has there been such
migration. These people continually go back home or move on with
a rapidity that is unheard of in previous eras. They experience what
Giddens (1990) has called disembedding and distanciation; that is, the
feeling that they belong in many places or none at the same time (see
also Castles and Davidson 2000). It is summed up in the heartfelt
exclamation of a young second-generation Anglo-Bangladeshi woman:
“They say that home is where the heart is, but I don’t know where my
heart is” (quoted in Eade 1997, 157). We emphasise that this is more
than a first generation experience.
These vast foreign populations end up in different places, not
only—as some commentators would have it—in the great global cities.
Their greatest movement is in Asia. But because of the constant phone
and e-mail contact with home, plus the frequent and rapid transport
by air, they never feel that break with their past which earlier migrants
did. The feeling of the nineteenth century migrant to Australia was
summed up in the plaintive lines of a folk song, Farewell the Old England
Forever. Today, the past continues to live on in the present, not just as
memory, for all of them. They are always living in two or more places
and times at once, so to speak. Time and place (or space) overlap to the
point that they cannot be distinguished when seeking to understand
affect, or what Marxists used to call “social being.” This is not an
entirely new phenomenon provided we make one caveat. For example,
Luis Bunuel felt fortunate that he had been born in the eighteenth
century (Basque country), grew up in the nineteenth (liberal Spain),
and reached maturity in the twentieth (France of the cinema). Gramsci
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intimated it when he discussed the bizarre combination of senso
comune, which he related to two anachronistic modes of production
or worlds being lived at the same time by peasants in parts of Italy. The
caveat is that it now involves the entire global working class and more
importantly, that the latter works in a world of decentralised and
rapidly changing production as “plug-in” or service workforces and not
in a repetitive time-immemorial way. The importance of this will be
made clear later.
The greatest number end up in new service industries built around
computer technology found in new growth centres. That does not
mean that local proletariats do not exist or deny that poverty and
misery are increasing under globalisation. It does mean that in
advanced capitalist societies, the situation of an industrial productive
space, where transformations would take place, can no longer
automatically be made central for political analysis without further
consideration. As I have often pointed out elsewhere (see Davidson
2000), the space of production (the factory), through whose times and
rhythms, different histories and identities were translated into those of
the class-in-itself and thence through political activity for-itself, does
not exist as a politically significant force in a networked world any
more, even in the “Third World.”
Thus, there are no necessarily shared spaces for workers who
reproduce capitalist relations in a new global epoch. Nor does the
experience there override the inherited different identities of the past,
even where such spaces still exist. Through the telephone, Internet, and
rapid and frequent plane trips home, a fragmentation—and not a
constitution—of identities takes place. In an earlier piece, I argued,
With no intention to stay or settle, rapid and regular returns “home,” and
the maintenance of contact through phone and Internet, [the new
migratory global workforces] are never obliged to leave or to identify with
a new place. They hold multiple passports and have multiple allegiances
that override those acquired in the factory, even if they work in such a
place. The maintenance of their multicultural associations means that
even into the second generation there is no transfer of allegiance (Eade
1997, 159). They are denizens, with no aspirations to be citizens—if this
means renouncing old identities and ties. As disembedded and distanciated
beings (Giddens 1990), they are, emotionally speaking, in many places at
the same time. Class-consciousness has therefore collapsed or retreated
into ultra-nationalism and racism among some of the old working class
(of advanced capitalist states). Fearful of the newcomers’ apparent threat
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to their economic and social conditions, they become ever more ready to
exclude them from such benefits. (Davidson 2000, 116)

The decentralisation of production and various plug-in workforces
and the growth in service occupations relative to those in industrial
production have apparently led to the end of a large class-conscious
proletariat in most advanced capitalist states. If those appearances are
what count, they add up to the apparent success of a global capitalist
hegemony without the possibility of creating a counter-hegemony.
One marker of this is the widespread popular acceptance that life is
about change and risk (or what in earlier times would have been called
“alienation”) and that to be human is to learn to live with it rather than
to seek to overcome it.
It is undeniable that Gramsci regarded the starting point for
hegemony to be the factory—a particular space. His notes on Americanism
and Fordism stated that explicitly and implicitly. The centrality of the
factory in the Gramscian theoretical edifice is incontrovertible up to
the Quaderni. Its strength in the analyses of the Lyons theses and the
Questione Meridionale is striking. It is just as undeniable that he also
added to the notions developed in the Ordine Nuovo period the need
for an alliance with the peasantry and thereof the middle class and
intellectuals. This necessitated compromises and a renunciation of the
proposition that the key to social understanding lies exclusively in the
place of industrial production. This was already thematic in the
Questione Meridionale. But at the core of his distribution of spatial roles
remained an irreducible notion that practices in particular spaces
transformed historical identities and created a revolutionary will, even
when the proletariat was no longer seen as an essential subject for social
transformation. This followed from his belief that the capacity of
theory to take hold and move masses of men and women required
precisely the sort of experience of the Turin factories in and after World
War I. No automatic development from the class-in-itself to the classfor-itself was possible. This is so even if we accept the thesis that the
party is central in Gramsci’s theoretical edifice.
Marxism’s capacity to become a political force thus required
organisation in the factory where human beings were brought together
in a particular way for the first time. The transformation of the
proletariat into a class that sought to become the State required a
particular praxis of transforming the place where they worked. This
capacity to realise the new organisation was then something that would
be brought to other classes through compromises. The latter in their
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practice and places would transform themselves out of the world in
which they lived and which was the source for the bizarre views of the
world they held. On such bizarre views rested the strength of bourgeois
hegemony.
The issue is whether Gramsci still subscribed to it when discussing
the global hegemony of the world market, which was tendentially
Americanist and Fordist. It should be recalled that this is the crucial
overriding hegemony which decides on the nature of the national or
local formations from which any counter-hegemony must be created.
The reply is explicit. In a pure situation where all the world became
America (as most globalists argue it has) and the spread of an American
style worldwide can also be observed on a cultural level (see Barber
1995). “Hegemony is born from the factory and needs for its exercise
no more than a minimum quantity of intermediary political and
ideological professionals” (Gramsci 1975, 2146). Moreover, the capacity
to realise Marxist theory as a political force in Italy had depended on
the degree to which the proletariat there conformed to the American
model in many regards.
Indeed, Gramsci’s basic position on this issue, which built on the
notions in the early Marx and in Feuerbach quite unconsciously in
many cases, never appeared to change. Gramsci made a similar humanism
where his predecessors saw the drive to change as something which
came from the shared suffering in the place of work; something which
no hegemony could ever eliminate and which consequently ensured
that no hegemony could ever exist 100 percent under capitalism. We
need only the famous article on Uomini di carne ed ossa to realise how
Gramsci thought the drive to solve misery through taking up new
theories started. This perspective continued in the world of the gorilla
ammaestrato (tamed gorilla), who was produced in as well as produced
the global economy’s heartlands. He wrote,
American industrialists have understood very well that “tamed gorilla” is
a phrase, that the worker remains “nevertheless” a man and that even he,
while he works, thinks as well {as going through the motions} or at least
has much greater possibilities to think, at least when he has got over the
crisis of adaptation and has not been eliminated: and not only does he
think, but the fact that he does not get immediate satisfaction from his
work, and understands that they want to turn him into a “tame gorilla,”
can lead him to a train of thought which is far from conformist. (Gramsci
1975, 2171)
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As such, we can only agree with Vacca’s version of Gramsci, in
which the emphasis on Americanism and Fordism and the notion of
the “gorilla ammaestrato” makes the place of production central to all
notions of space (the place) where identities (time) are transformed.
While a careful philological investigation may show that Gramsci
did not share Lenin’s or Marx’s notions of space and time completely,
both my and Vacca’s grosso modo (exposition) demonstrate that he does.
It is important at the outset to state that except for one small entry on
time, Gramsci addressed neither concept directly in the Quaderni. Nor
did his references to Aristotle, the key to a study of the space-time
relation, refer to that dimension of the Physics. This suggests that such
matters were regarded as unproblematic and taken for granted by
Gramsci (Gramsci 1975, 1902-3).
The problem of this notion of the relation of space and time where
a shared praxis in a specific space changes identities inherited from the
past (usually a peasantry which is transformed into a proletariat) is that
globalisation theory claims that production has become decentralised.
There are no longer shared spaces where suffering can lead to unity
against an oppressor.

RETHINKING COUNTER-HEGEMONY
We are driven to the conclusion that under globalisation the space of
production has very much changed that it makes global capitalist
hegemony extraordinarily efficient. But there seems not much of an
opening to build a counter-hegemony of a traditional sort. Indeed,
while progressives like Sassen (1998) are still seeking such spaces of
opposition in the global cities’ migrant workforces, many commentators
on the identity experience of globalised denizens claim that the spacetime change has done much more than fragmented identity. As we saw,
that notion was present in Bunuel and Gramsci. It can be found in
many other authors and coped within their theory. The more radical
position argues that the conscious level of identity (whole, alienated,
fragmented and so on) is less important than what has taken place on
a corporeal, felt level. Human beings are simply not finite corporeal
sufferers (in the sense of undergoing the presence of their corporeality
so that suffering precedes thought), but they experience themselves
quite differently. They feel their transitoriness and live it rather than
measure their lives in a finite way. At its most extreme, identity is not
spatial as it is in the fragmentation metaphor that presumes frontiers.
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Identity is a constant change and therefore, not a subject moving
through time.
To accept such a conclusion is to assume that the space-time
relation as used by Gramsci is no longer useful because the globalisation
theorists are correct that a new space-time relation now exists everywhere;
Or, if not, that the new space-time relation is crucially important in the
contemporary epoch that marks the end of challenges to capitalism and
liberal-democracy.
Fortunately for defenders of hegemony, both assertions are contested
even among theorists of globalisation. They both deny that its spacetime relation has displaced the older space-time relation in many
countries which are not part of its system. They query assertions that
even if this first proposition is correct, what is all-important is what
happens within the globalised space and time. Concretely, this can be
reduced to showing that many countries are not part of globalised
production based on the changed speed of communication and on the
old production base (factories). Alternatively, it could be that in the
key cities of globalisation, the new migrant workforces share a new
identity that can be organised in new ways.
Castells (1989), for example, makes clear the first point in this
contestation: the world of the Internet leaves out Africa, Latin
America, and some of Asia. It is not truly global. In such places, life and
space-time relations go on as they have for centuries and movement
does not mean the fragmentation of identity. It still means
transformation in the shared experience of capitalism’s exploitation
and oppression. Sebastião Salgado’s brilliant photographs show how
much this world still exists. It is not inappropriate to include the new
China as part of this capitalisation process, which means that a
majority of the world’s population is not part of globalisation as we
have discussed it. Some areas have seen the worsening of conditions
due to their exclusion from globalisation’s benefits. Most striking is
the return of Africa and certain areas of central Asia into chaotic,
almost Hobbesian conditions of life. Certainly, world capitalism as a
social disorder greater than the exclusionary unequal exchanges of the
market still exists for the majority of the world’s population (Arrighi
and Silver 1999).
Yet many of this global majority feel today that the way to solve the
problems is not to stay, unite, and fight for a new order at home, but
rather to flee to where better conditions are to be found. The global
powerhouses’ need for foreign labour encourages this movement. Two

30

GRAMSCI, HEGEMONY AND GLOBALISATION

recent films, El Norte (The North) and L’America (The America),
illustrate this. In both cases, the flight is to fulfil an idea of a place of
“freedom,” although, as was the case a hundred years ago, the immigrant
often meets real conditions worse than in the country of origin.
However, it was and is believed that those who dare succeed. The scale
of illegal immigration and the fight for a passport of an advanced state
are staples of contemporary newspapers. This labour mobility undoes
class formation, even among those who do not share in the benefits of
globalisation but dream of doing so. It remains to be seen whether the
new nationalism and its closed borders, which keep such migrants at
home with their contradictions, will foster conditions for the
constitution of new collective working-class consciousness.
In reference to huge populations, the two percent of the world that
makes up the new globally mobile workforce of supposedly fragmented
identities is a risible minority. Its centrality for a revivified counterhegemony comes from its location in the great global cities where,
according to Sassen and others, the driving motors of globalisation are
able to utilise information most profitably. Put simply, the great
traditional workforces cannot strike at capitalism in its new heart. On
the other hand, the two percent might be able to do so if it was not
disaggregated because of its dispersal in new workforces, which have no
central workplaces or sufficient shared experience to overcome cultural
differences that divide rather than unite—if it did not live the new spacetime relation. As Castells has pointed out, the social relations of
production have changed greatly and ended up excluding, even in the
global cities, large numbers of people who are irrelevant from the logic
of globalisation. He shows that there is today a fundamental
differentiation of self-programmable and highly productive labour, as
well as generic and expendable labour; that there has been an
individualisation of labour undermining collective organisation (this
has been, in part, our point about the end of the factory). This leaves
the weakest sections of labour to their fate. And finally, the combination
of these globalising phenomena has been the slow demise of the welfare
state, which removes the safety net for people who are not individually
well-off (Castells 1998, 344).
The next section of this paper is a tentative view of how a counterhegemony might be constituted. It assumes that the important section
of the workforce is the new multiethnic workforces who make up the
periphery in the centre.
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A NEW HEGEMONY
We must recall that global capitalism fixes class relations in an impure
state—a pure duality of capitalists and proletariat never develops
anywhere. This means that any socialist transformation requires the
building of a cross-class alliance of majorities on national-popular
bases, rather than class. Therefore, that hegemony, which permits new
ideas to become social forces has to win out over the old hegemony in
an organisational “war of position.”
But while globalisation divides the world into the “fast” and the
“slow” and thus continues the contradiction on economic and social
levels, it homogenises it ideologically as well. This is where political
struggle takes place. It does so by encouraging labour migration to new
labour markets. This we will call the “exit principle.” Local contradictions
can be fled forever in a flight forward, or so it is believed. The effect is
to make global capitalist hegemony almost 100 percent even if it can
never reach that extent. Since hegemony is a matter of organisation or
structure, we look for what and where it does not cover the field of
contradictions.
It is significant that in a world where objective contradictions are
increasing, even in the global cities, global hegemony is almost
complete. There are no oppositions on a global scale which are easily
identifiable. Castells can only point to the Zapatistas—a tiny and evermenaced movement—as an illustration of a globalised left opposition
to the system. The Zapatistas certainly remain at home to fight on their
terrain and they use the Internet to keep their presence globally alive.
To the extent that they succeed, they can expect the Mexican government
not to slaughter them out of hand. The recent loss of visibility must
be alarming to them.
In stating that this is the only globalised left opposition, we are also
drawing attention to the trap of localism. The protagonists of the latter
would reply that there is much local opposition in lesser spaces than
those of the nation-state. This is the position of the new republicans
(Viroli 1999, Pettit 1999) who build programmes around winning
control of local government in semifederal subsidiarity systems like
that of the European Union. Whatever the merits of such movements—
and I have the same reservations about them that I have always had
about social movements—they do not address the problem of global
power which is supranational, not infranational, and whose expression
is not even through supranational organisational institutions. It relies
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on the absence of government and governance in its global spaces and
on the uncontrollability of its lightning-fast transactions.
We do not need Castells to remind us that in this Information
Age, the main battles are what he calls “cultural.” Gramsci’s point that
battles are won and lost on the terrain of ideology is a much earlier and
more complex explanation of the mediations between objective
economic and social conditions and politics. It can also account
generally for the fact that the continuation of contradiction—as must
ever be the case under capitalism—and the worsening conditions for the
majority of the world’s population do not mean the emergence of a
political opposition to capitalism. To do that political organisation
has always been essential and certainly will take a long time in the
present epoch. Moreover, Gramsci, as we have already suggested,
argued that the attitudes in the key areas are what matters, whence
political lessons are extrapolated and exported elsewhere. Where are
those places and what are their specific problems under globalisation—
the contradictions on which an organisational programme that learns
from those workers themselves in a maieutic fashion might be built—
reminiscent of Ordine Nuovo?
We hypothesise that they exist where the structural ability to flee
local contradiction is blocked (compare Hirschmann 1970). It is where
workers, understood as migrants, are excluded from the possibility of
attaining their dream that this contradiction appears and becomes
common to all migrants, including and especially those in the global
cities (compare Sassen 1998, 177-219).
We cannot do more than sketch in here what seem to be the
motivations of people to run away from contradictions in the local
terrain. Where conditions are bad for workers and relative labour
mobility is present, they move to those labour markets where capitalism
is hiring. The most significant movements have been within huge
countries like China where about 100 million are moving into the new
factories. These have left centres to relocate in areas of cheap labour.
This internal movement does not threaten national sovereignty directly.
That threat starts when we consider the huge transnational movement
of labour which has transformed practically the entire world (with the
exception of North Asia) into multiethnic societies of a new type in 20
years. As we have remarked, the majority move in Asia and from Asia
and Africa. The recent Asian crisis meant the repatriation of two
million Indonesians from Malaysia (Castles and Davidson 2000). The
real dream is, of course, to move to Europe or the USA and a few other
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countries and obtain that visa which allows you to return as often as
you like. The ideology of many migrants is that of attaining far da se
(freedom).
It is a constant surprise that this dream is so strong when those who
have made it—say, to New York City—must be expected, given the
overall conditions of exploitation and humiliation most experience,
to write home warning that the “flight forward” is a chimera for most.
There are two explanations for this. First, for some, like the astronauts
from Asia, it is a great success except on the most intimate human side
(Ong 1999). For the rest, it might be argued that even if exploitation
is pervasive (Ph.D.-holders driving taxis or walking symbolic analysts
dogs in Central Park), overall conditions are better than back home.
There is some anecdotal evidence that many of those who suffer most
on arrival lie about their success in their reports home. Whatever the
explanation, it is clear that negative reports about conditions in the
global centres are not strong enough to discourage a continuing desire
to leave and get out of areas where poverty is increased by globalisation.
This is much like earlier rural exoduses to the big city. What cannot be
gainsaid is the lesson learnt that there is always another place to move
on to and so the temporary setback in one place lead to the inference
that one should move on again.
As a result, the development of class consciousness politics in
factories of origin is defused by the failure of the two percent in the
global workforce to clarify the presence of the periphery in the centre.
I think of Filipinas who first move to work in free trade zones; learn in
that experience to become militant, organised workers; and then,
forced by human pressures like supporting their families, leave to
become maids (or worse) in Korea, Japan, the Middle East, and
Australia. That two percent and its attitudes thus become keys to the
ruling hegemony and the spaces that it does not cover. It is there that
contradictions are found and a counter-hegemony could be built.
Overall, the descriptions we have of their mores vis-à-vis their lives
in their new places correspond with those touched on in Gramsci’s
notion of the tamed gorilla, even though they do not work in factories.
For them, life is work, sometimes very skilled; nonetheless, it is isolated
and unorganised as a collective workforce. As workers, they accept the
risk society and the dangerous privilege of fare da se. They have little
sense of solidarity with their fellows as workers. What is concretely
important to them is the attainment of citizenship and its rights in
their new place(s) of work. What blocks that attainment are nationality
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laws based on local nation-state priority and the privilege given to the
old majority host communities. Everywhere, migrants make common
cause against the new nationalism that fosters their exclusions from
rights—whether in California, Australia or France. This is the exclusion
which affects them all and on which, it appears, their peak bodies as
ethnic minorities can often make common cause with both local
indigenous peoples and with the progressives.
So the new “war of position,” always understood as having a local
starting point, may be best built around human rights campaigns for
minorities or migrant workers in global cities. The first of these is free
or freer movement in the face of recent attempts to limit immigration—
a worldwide trend often driven by reactionary and neofascist groups
among older majorities. After the right to life, freedom of movement
is the most basic human right. Interference with exit at nation-state
frontiers is against international law. Unfortunately, that is not the case
for entrance. Governments and business sometimes disagree on this
matter. Often in history, the demands of capital for labour have meant
the easing of immigration and nationality restrictions in the face of
ideologically-driven state concerns. I think typically of the 1889 French
law on nationality. In my own country, there is open disagreement
between the conservative government and the Business Council on
these matters. It is not germane that capital, following the views of
Ohmae (1995), wants free labour movement to push down wages.
They have a potential for an alliance with the immigrant working class
on this issue. The danger of endorsing capitalist plans without building
a bloc against the state could be obviated by further political programmes.
A central plank of these would have to be the extension of their right
to have a voice in political arrangements. This can only be attained by
the extension of democratic rights, especially those to a vote, regardless
of ethnic belonging or nationality. While one way forward might be the
principles adopted in the European Union, especially that of devolved
power to local communities, it requires more than a revival of the local
republicanism so dear to some heirs to the Gramsci (and Piero Gobetti)
of 1919-1920. Since the counter-hegemony has to have a global reach
to oppose global forces, it will also require the fostering of norms for
more than that of consumer-citizens, which is the goal of global capital.
I note as an aside that a quick dismissal of the consumer-citizen is not
wise: its logics can lead to the development of a cross-cultural, crossclass solidarity.
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The “war of position” around what migrant workers want—
empowering citizenship rights—puts such continuers of Gramsci into
the camp of the supporters of the proposals of the United Nation’s
Global Commission and against defenders of national sovereignty,
rights, and working classes. In their place, or as an addition, it would
add the need for a global citizenship that makes international laws and
conventions override any local, cultural references. In turn, this means
a new notion of the multicultural and universal citizen which eschews
a strongly affirmative action based on cultural deprivation, if it is
limited to that potentially divisive policy. These are all matters I have
discussed elsewhere and would be happy to provide further information
about.
This combination of local and global may even then be too “thin”
a notion to sustain a social transformation from a passive to an active
revolution. It is possible to envisage a counter-hegemony built around
migrants’ demands for equal democratic and human rights with
majorities in host communities. It is possible to believe that only a
strong democracy could achieve that objective. But radical democracy
with participation at multiple levels of the state does not necessarily
mean affective commitment. This is doubly so once the limits of such
democracy in wide spaces are addressed and interlocutors become
passwords on a computer. The people will never meet in an agora again.
Nor indeed will control of a national space be sufficient. Why should
we expect a global attachment to have more force no matter how
effectively it starts?D

REFERENCES
Arrighi, Giovanni and Beverly J. Silver. 1999. Chaos and governance in the modern world
system. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Barber, Benjamin. 1995. Jihad versus McWorld. New York: Times Books.
Cammett, John, ed. 1991. Bibliografia Gramsciana, 1922-1988. Rome: Riuniti.
Castells, Manuel. 1989. The informational city: Informational technology, economic
restructuring and the urban regional process. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
———. 1998. End of millennium. Vol. 3 of The information age: Economy, society and culture.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Castles, Stephen and Alastair Davidson. 2000. Citizenship and migration: Globalism and
the politics of belonging. London: Macmillan
Davidson, Alastair. 1972. The varying seasons of Gramscian studies. Political Studies 20
(4): 448-461.
———. 1982. The theory and practice of Italian communism. London: Merlin.
———. 2000. Democracy, class and citizenship in a globalising world. In Citizenship and
democracy in a global era, ed. Andrew Vandenberg, 110-122. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.

36

GRAMSCI, HEGEMONY AND GLOBALISATION

Eade, John. 1997. Living the global city: Globalisation as a local process. London and New
York: Routledge.
Finocchiaro, Maurice A. 1999. Beyond right and left: Democratic elitism in Mosca and
Gramsci. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fontana, Benedetto. 1993. Hegemony and power: On the relation between Gramsci and
Machiavelli. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
———. 2000. Logos and kratos: Gramsci and the ancients on hegemony. Journal of the
History of Ideas, 61 (2): 305-326.
Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The consequences of modernity. Cambridge: Polity/Basil
Blackwell.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1965. Lettere dal carcere. Eds. Sergio Caprioglio and Elsa Fubini.
Turin: Einaudi.
———. 1966. La questione meridionale. Eds. Franco De Felice and Valentino Parlato.
Rome: Editori Riuniti.
———. 1975. Quaderni del carcere. 4 vols. Edizione critica dell’Istituto Gramsci. Ed.
Valentino Gerratana. Turin: Einaudi.
Gruppi, Luciano. 1976. Il concetto di egemonia in Gramsci. Rome: Istituto Gramsci/
Riuniti.
Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. Exit, voice and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organisations
and states. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Liguori, Guido. 1996. Gramsci conteso: Storia di un dibattito, 1922-1996. Rome: Riuniti.
Losurdo, Domenico. 1997. Antonio Gramsci dal liberalismo al “comunismo critico.” Rome:
Gamberetti.
Montanari, Marcello. 1991. La liberte il tempo: Osservazioni sulla democrazia tra Gramsci e
Marx. Rome: Riuniti.
Nair, Sami. 1997. Contre les lois Pasqua. Paris: Arléa-Poche.
Ohmae, Kenichi. 1995. The end of the nation state: The rise of regional economies. London:
Harper Collins.
Ong, Aiwa. 1999. Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality. Durham and
London: Duke University Press.
Perelman, Ch. ed. 1975. Dialectiques: International Institute of Philosophy entretiens in
Varna, 15-22 September 1973. The Hague: Martin Nijhoff.
Pettit, Philip. 1999. Republicanism: A theory of freedom and government. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Pizzorno, Alessandro. 1969. Gramsci e la cultura contemporanea. Rome: Editori RiunitiIstituto Gramsci.
Sassen, Saskia. 1998. Globalisation and its discontents: Essays on the new mobility of people
and money. New York: New Press.
Vacca, Giuseppe. 1991. Gramsci e Togliatti. Rome: Editori Riuniti.
Viroli, Maurizio. 1999. Repubblicanesimo. Bari-Roma: Laterza.

_________________
ALASTAIR DAVIDSON is professor of citizenship and human rights at University of Wollongong, Australia. Send correspondence to the author at alastair@uow.edu.au. This article is
an expanded version of an entry on hegemony to appear in Marxistische Worterbuch, eds. T.
Haug and T. Weber (forthcoming).

